

predominantly agrarian but not exclusively so, since professionals, merchants, industrialists, and urban bosses of political machines are often involved. The basis has been "strong local power organized pyramid-fashion so that the 'boss' systems or 'chiefdoms'—*cacicatos*—interlock with one another to form the political infrastructure in many Luso-Hispanic states," with a restricted oligarchy of nationally influential men at the top connected consciously through social ties, formal and informal, with the local *caciques*.

Such structures, through constant transformations,⁴² have survived under both authoritarian and semidemocratic regimes at the center up to our days. Sultanistic authoritarianism reproduces at the national level some of the worst features of local nineteenth-century *caudillesmo*, perhaps due to the absence of some of the social controls by a local community.

IV. AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

Toward a Definition of Authoritarian Regimes

In an earlier essay we attempted to define a variety of nondemocratic and non-totalitarian political systems as authoritarian if they were

political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones. (Linz, 1964, p. 255)

This definition was developed by contrasting those systems both with competitive democracies and with the ideal type of totalitarian systems (Linz, 1964, 1970a, 1973a, 1973b). It implies clear conceptual boundaries with democratic politics but somewhat more diffuse ones with totalitarianism, since pre- and posttotalitarian situations and regimes might also fit the definition. A further delimitation is the exclusion of traditional legitimate regimes, on account of the different sources of legitimacy of the leadership, or oligarchies ruling authoritarily. The type of regimes we have labelled sultanistic-authoritarian regimes have much in common with those we intend to cover with our definition of authoritarian but differ from them in the importance in sultanistic-authoritarian regimes of arbitrary and unpredictable use of power and the weakness of the limited political pluralism. For other reasons we find it convenient to exclude from our definition the nineteenth-century semiconstitutional monarchies, which were halfway between traditional legitimate and authoritarian rule (with monarchical, estate, and even feudal elements mixed with emerging democratic institutions), and the censitary democracies, where the restricted suffrage represented a step in the process of development toward

modern competitive democracies based at least on universal male suffrage. The oligarchic democracies that, particularly in Latin America, have resisted pressures toward further democratization through the persistence of suffrage limitations based on illiteracy, control or manipulation of elections by *caciques*, frequent recourse to the moderating power of the army, undifferentiated parties, etc., find themselves on the borderline between modern authoritarian regimes and democracy. They are closer to democracy in their constitutional and ideological conception but sociologically more similar to some authoritarian regimes. Our delimitation by exclusion still leaves us with a large number of contemporary political systems fitting our definition and therefore requiring, as we shall see, the characterization of a number of subtypes.

Our concept focuses on the way of exercising power, organizing power, linking with the societies, on the nature of the belief systems sustaining it, and on the role of citizens in the political process without, however, paying attention to the substantive content of policies, the goals pursued, the *raison d'être* of such regimes. It does not tell us much about the institutions, groups, and social strata forming part of the limited pluralism or about those excluded. The emphasis on the more strictly political aspects exposes the concept to some of the same criticism of formalism advanced against a general concept of totalitarianism, or for that matter of democracy. We feel, however, that by characterizing regimes independently of the policies they pursue we tend to deal in a distinctive way with problems faced by all political systems, for example, the relationship between politics and religion and the intellectuals. The conditions for their emergence, stability, transformation, and perhaps breakdown are also quite distinct. The general and abstract character of our definition makes it even more imperative to go down on the ladder of abstraction into the study of the variety of sub types, as we shall do here.

We speak of authoritarian regimes rather than authoritarian governments to indicate the relatively low specificity of political institutions: they often penetrate the life of the society, preventing, even forcibly, the political expression of certain group interests (as religion in Turkey and in Mexico after the revolution, labor in Spain) or shaping them by interventionist policies like those of corporativist regimes. In contrast to some analysis of totalitarianism, we speak of regimes rather than of societies because the distinction between state and society is not fully obliterated even in the intentions of the rulers.

The pluralistic element is the most distinctive feature of these regimes, but it cannot be strongly enough emphasized that in contrast to democracies, with their almost unlimited pluralism, their institutionalized political pluralism, we are dealing here with limited pluralism. In fact, it has been suggested that we could also have characterized these regimes as of limited monism. In fact, these two terms would suggest the fairly wide range in which those regimes operate. The limitation of pluralism may be legal or de facto, implemented more or less effectively, confined to strictly political groups or extended

to interest groups, as long as there remain groups not created by or dependent on the state which influence the political process one way or another. Some regimes go even so far as to institutionalize the political participation of the limited number of independent groups or institutions and even encourage their emergence without, however, leaving any doubt that the rulers ultimately define which groups they will allow to exist and under what conditions. In addition, political power is not legally and/or de facto accountable through such groups to the citizens, even when it might be quite responsive to them. This is in contrast to democratic governments, where the political forces are formally dependent on the support of constituencies, whatever de facto deviations the Michelsian "iron law of oligarchy" might introduce. In authoritarian regimes the men who come to power reflecting the views of various groups and institutions derive their position not from the support from those groups alone but from the trust placed in them by the leader or ruling group, which certainly takes into account their prestige and their influence. They have a kind of constituency; we might call it a potential constituency, but this is not solely or even principally the source of their power. A constant process of co-optation of leaders is the mechanism by which different sectors or institutions become participants in the system, and this process accounts for the characteristics of the elite: a certain heterogeneity in its background and career patterns and the smaller number of professional politicians, men who have made their career in strictly political organizations, compared with the number of those recruited from the bureaucracy, technically skilled elites, the army, interest groups, and sometimes religious groups.

As we shall see, in some of these regimes an official or a single or privileged party is one more or less important component of the limited pluralism. On paper such parties often claim the monopolistic power of the totalitarian parties and presumably perform the same functions, but in reality they have to be kept clearly distinct. The absence or weakness of a political party often makes lay organizations sponsored by or linked with the Church, like Catholic Action or the Opus Dei in Spain, a reservoir of leadership for such regimes not too different from their function in the recruitment of elites of Christian democratic parties (Hermet, 1973). The single party more often than not is what the Africans have called a *parti unifié* rather than a *parti unique*, a party based on the fusion of different elements rather than a single disciplined body (Foltz, 1965). Often such parties are a creation from above rather than from the grass roots, created by the group in power rather than a party-conquering power like in totalitarian systems.

In the definition of authoritarian regimes we use the term mentality rather than ideology, from the distinction of the German sociologist Theodor Geiger (1932, pp. 77-79). For him ideologies are systems of thought more or less intellectually elaborated and organized, often in written form, by intellectuals, pseudointellectuals, or with their assistance. Mentalities are ways of thinking

and feeling, more emotional than rational, that provide noncodified ways of reacting to different situations. He uses a very graphic German expression: mentality is *subjektiver Geist* (even when collective); ideology is *objektiver Geist*. Mentality is intellectual attitude; ideology is intellectual content. Mentality is psychic predisposition, ideology is reflection, self-interpretation; mentality is *precious*, ideology later; mentality is formless, fluctuating—ideology, however, is firmly formed. Ideology is a concept of the sociology of culture, mentality is a concept of the study of social character. Ideologies have a strong utopian element, mentalities are closer to the present or the past. Ideological belief systems based on fixed elements and characterized by strong affect and closed cognitive structure, with considerable constraining power, important for mass mobilization and manipulation, are characteristic of totalitarian systems. In contrast, the consensus in democratic regimes is based on a procedural consensus, the commitment to which acquires some of the qualities of ideological beliefs.

The utility and validity of the distinction between mentality and ideology has been questioned by Bolivar Lamounier (1974). He notes that as an actual political variable, as cognitive forms of consciousness actually operative in political life, particularly in the communication process, they are not really that different. He feels that the distinction implies a hasty dismissal of the ruling ideas of authoritarian regimes as an object worth study. Nothing could be further from our intent. He rightly notes the effectiveness of symbolic communication, the multiplicity of referential connections between symbol and social reality, in authoritarian regimes.

Much of the argument hinges on the philosophical assumptions about the definition of ideology, an aspect into which we shall not go. Both ideologies and mentalities as characterized above are part of a broader phenomenon of ideas leading to action-oriented ideals—which are an aspect of the institutionalization of power relationships for which Lamounier prefers to use the term ideology.

The important question is, Why do ideas take a different form, different coherence, articulation, comprehensiveness, explicitness, intellectual elaboration, and normativeness? On those various dimensions ideologies and mentalities differ. Those differences are not without consequences in the political process. It is more difficult to conceive of mentalities as binding, requiring a commitment of the rulers and the subjects irrespective of costs and of the need of coercion to implement them. Mentalities are more difficult to diffuse among the masses, less susceptible to be used in education, less likely to come into conflict with religion or science and more difficult to use as a test of loyalty. The range of issues for which an answer can be derived from them, the degree of precision of those answers, the logic of the process of derivation, and the visibility of the contradictions between them and policies are very different. Their constraining power to legitimate and delegitimate actions are very differ-

ent. The student of an authoritarian regime would be hard pressed to identify explicit references to ideas guiding the regime in legal theorizing and judicial decisions in nonpolitical cases, in art criticism and scientific arguments, and would find only limited evidence of their use in education. He or she certainly would not find the rich and distinctive language, the new terminology and esoteric use of an ideology, all difficult to understand to the outsider but important to the participants. Nor would he or she find in the libraries stacks of books and publications of an ideological character elaborating endlessly and in a variety of directions those ideas.

Let us admit that the distinction is and cannot be clear cut but reflects two extreme poles with a large gray area in between. Certainly bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes are likely to reflect more the mentality of their rulers. In others we are likely to find what Susan Kaufman (1970) has called a programmatic consensus and in others a set of ideas derived from a variety of sources haphazardly combined to give the impression of being an ideology in the sense we have described in the totalitarian systems. Certainly the authoritarian regimes on the periphery of ideological centers feel the pressure to imitate, incorporate, manipulate dominant ideological styles. This can often lead scholars to serious misunderstanding of such regimes, to misplaced emphases. The real question to ask is, What power arrangements seem to prevent ideological articulation in such regimes? In our view the complex coalition of forces, interests, political traditions, and institutions—part of the limited pluralism—requires the rulers to use as symbolic referent the minimum common denominator of the coalition. In this way the rulers achieve the neutralization of a maximum of potential opponents in the process of taking power (in the absence of the highly mobilized mass of supporters). The vagueness of the mentality blunts the lines of cleavage in the coalition, allowing the rulers to retain the loyalty of disparate elements. The lack of an assertion of specific, articulated, and explicit commitments facilitates adaptation to changing conditions in the nonsupportive environment, particularly in the case of authoritarian regimes in the Western democratic sphere of influence. (The reference to generic values like patriotism and nationalism, economic development, social justice, and order and the discreet and pragmatic incorporation of ideological elements derived from the dominant political centers of the time allow rulers who have gained power without mobilized mass support to neutralize opponents, co-opt a variety of supporters, and decide policies pragmatically.) Mentalities, semi- or pseudoideologies reduce the utopian strain in politics and with it conflict that otherwise would require either institutionalization or more repression than the rulers could afford. The limited utopianism obviously is congruent with conservative tendencies.

Such regimes pay a price for their lack of ideology in our sense of the term. It limits their capacity to mobilize people to create the psychological and emotional identification of the masses with the regime. The absence of an articulate

ideology, of a sense of ultimate meaning, of long run purposes, of an *a priori* model of ideal society reduces the attractiveness of such regimes to those for whom ideas, meaning, and values are central. The alienation of intellectuals, students, youth, and deeply religious persons from such regimes, even when successful and relatively liberal compared with totalitarian systems, can be explained in part by the absence or weakness of ideology. One of the advantages of authoritarian regimes with an important fascist component was that this derivative ideology appealed to some of those groups. But it also was one of the sources of tension when the disregard of the elite of the regime for those ideological elements became apparent.

In theory we should be able to distinguish this content of ideas of the regime, including its style, from the ideas guiding or influencing the political process as an actual political variable. It could be argued that the first aspect, to which we will be looking for the objectivization, is ultimately less central than the subjective appropriation, the various forms of consciousness actually operative in political life. However, we feel that the distinction between mentality and ideology is not irrelevant for the way in which they affect activities and communication processes in politics and society. The complex interaction between both levels of analysis precludes any *a priori* statement about the direction in which the relationship operates. Probably in totalitarian systems the actual political processes are more deeply affected by the content of the ideology, while in authoritarian regimes the mentalities of the rulers, not having to be equally explicit, might reflect more the social and political realities.

The elusiveness of mentalities, the mimetic and derivative character of the so-called ideologies of authoritarian regimes, has limited the number of scholarly studies of this dimension of such regimes. Only interview studies of the elites and surveys of the population, of great sophistication given the limited freedom of expression and the obstacles in the communication processes, make this an important dimension in the study of such regimes. The typology of authoritarian regimes we will present relies more on the character of the limited pluralism and the degree of apathy or mobilization than on an analysis of types of mentalities.

In our original definition we emphasized the actual absence of extensive and intensive political mobilization but admitted that at some point of the development of such regimes there could be such mobilization. The characteristic of low and limited political mobilization is therefore a factual characteristic on which such regimes tend to converge, for a variety of reasons. As we shall see in the discussion of the subtypes, in some regimes the depoliticization of the mass of the citizens falls into the intent of the rulers, fits with their mentality, and reflects the character of the components of the limited pluralism supporting them. In other types of systems the rulers initially intend to mobilize their supporters and the population at large into active involvement in the

regime and its organizations. Their public commitments, often derivative ideological conceptions, push them in that direction. The historical and social context of the establishment of the regime favors or demands such a mobilization through a single party and its mass organizations. The struggle for national independence from a colonial power or for full independence, the desire to incorporate into the political process sectors of the society untapped by any previous political leadership, or the defeat of a highly mobilized opponent in societies in which democracy had allowed and encouraged such a mobilization lead to the emergence of mobilizational authoritarian regimes of a nationalist, populist, or fascist variety. In reality there is a likelihood of convergence of regimes starting from such different assumptions following quite different routes. That convergence should not, however, obscure many important differences derived from those origins in terms of the type of pluralism emerging, the legitimacy formulae chosen, the response to crises situations, the capacity for transformation, the sources and types of opposition, etc.

Ultimately the degree of political mobilization and with it the opportunities for participation in the regime of those among the citizens supporting it are a result of the other two dimensions used in the definition of authoritarian regimes. Mobilization and participation ultimately become difficult to sustain unless the regime moves in a more totalitarian or democratic direction. Effective mobilization, particularly through a single party and its mass organizations, would be perceived as a threat by the other components of the limited pluralism, typically the army, the bureaucracy, the churches, or interest groups. To break through those constraining conditions would require moves in the totalitarian direction. The failure to break through those conditions and the limited pluralism standing in the way to totalitarianism has been well analyzed by Alberto Aquarone, who quotes this revealing conversation of Mussolini with an old syndicalist friend:

If you could imagine the effort it has taken me to search for a possible equilibrium in which I could avoid the collision of antagonistic powers which touched each other side by side, jealous, distrustful one of the other, government, party, monarchy, Vatican, army, militia, prefects, provincial party leaders, ministers, the head of the Confederazioni [corporative structures] and the giant monopolistic interests, etc. you will understand they are the indigestions of totalitarianism, in which I did not succeed in melting that "estate" that I had to accept in 1922 without reservations. A pathological connecting tissue linking the traditional and circumstantial deficiencies of this great, small, Italian people, which a tenacious therapy of twenty years has achieved to modify only on the surface. (Aquarone, 1965, p. 302)

We have described how the maintenance of equilibrium between those limited pluralisms limits in reality the effectiveness of the mobilization to a single party and ultimately has to lead to the apathy of the members and activ-

ists, since such a party offers limited access to power compared with other channels. Underdevelopment, particularly of a large rural population living in isolated areas and engaging in subsistence agriculture, often linked with traditional or clientelistic power structures integrated into the unified party, despite the ideological pronouncements, the organization charts, and the machinery of plebiscitarian elections, does not create a participatory political culture, not even controlled or manipulated participation.

As we shall see in more detail, the authoritarian regimes that emerge after a period of competitive democratic participation that created an unsolvable conflict in the society opt for depoliticization and apathy, which is felt by many citizens as a relief from the tensions of the previous period. Initially this is the apathy of those defeated by the new regime, but in the absence of a disciplined totalitarian mass party and its mass organizations combined with terror, little effort will be made to integrate them to participate in the system. As the tensions and hatreds that produced a mobilization for the system diminish, the supporters are also likely to lapse into apathy, which often the rulers might welcome to avoid pressures to make good the promises they made in the process of mobilization.

The absence of an ideology, the heterogeneous and compromise character, and often mimetism of the guiding ideas, and above all the mentality of the rulers, particularly military elites, bureaucrats, experts, and co-opted politicians of pro-regime parties, are serious obstacles in the process of mobilization and participation. Without an ideology it becomes difficult to mobilize activists for voluntary campaigns, regular attendance at party meetings, face-to-face propaganda activities, etc. Without an ideology with utopian components it is difficult to attract those interested in politics as an end in itself rather than a means for more pragmatic and immediate interests. Without ideology the young, the students, the intellectuals are not likely to get involved in politics and provide the cadres for politicization of the population. Without the utopian element, without the appeal to broader constituencies that would require a participatory pluralism rather than the limited, controlled, and co-opted pluralism of elites, the appeals based on a consensual, nonconflictive society, except in moments of upsurge of nationalism or of danger to the regime, tend to reduce politics to administration of the public interest and to the de facto expression of particular interests.

The limited pluralism of authoritarian regimes and the different share that the tolerated pluralistic components have in the exercise of power in different moments lead to complex patterns of semiopposition and pseudoopposition within the regime (Linz, 1973a). There is semiopposition by groups that are not dominant or represented in the governing group and that engage in partial criticism but are willing to participate in power without fundamentally challenging the regime. Without being institutionalized such groups are not illegitimate, even when they lack a legal framework in which to operate. They might

be highly critical of the government and some aspects of the institutional order, but they distinguish between these and the leader of the regime and accept the historical legitimacy or at least necessity of the authoritarian formula. There are groups that advocate different emphases and policy, groups that join in supporting the establishment of the regime but in the hope of achieving goals not shared by their coalition partners. There is dissidence among those who initially identified with the system but did not participate in its establishment, typically the Young Turks of the regime, and among those within the regime who want to work for goals that are not illegitimate, like the restoration of a previous regime initially announced but never realized. There are those who had stronger ideological commitments but accepted seeing them postponed to gain power against an enemy, those with a foreign model and/or even loyalty from which the rulers attempt to distance themselves, and in the late stages of such a regime those who oppose its transformation, specifically its liberalization and the abandonment of its exclusionary character. Semiopposition is likely to appear among men of the older generation who joined in the establishment of the regime to pursue goals they had already formulated before the takeover. But it also appears among the intellectuals and the young, particularly students who have taken seriously the rhetorical pronouncements of the leadership and who in addition find that there are no effective channels for political participation. Not infrequently the semiopposition within the regime becomes an alegal opposition. It has given up hope of transforming the regime from the inside but is not yet ready to move into illegal or subversive activities and finds intermittent tolerance sometimes based on the personal ties established in earlier years. The weakness of the efforts of political socialization and indoctrination in authoritarian regimes also accounts for the fact that when the third generation, never incorporated in the regime, discovers politics it might turn to an alegal opposition. The autonomy left by the regime to certain social organizations, the limited efforts of liberalization and increased participation in the regime organizations, and the relative openness to other societies create opportunities for the emergence of an alegal opposition, which sometimes serves as a front for an illegal opposition that is ready to infiltrate the organizations of the regime, rejecting the moral qualms about participating in it held by other opponents. Opposition is often channeled into formally apolitical organizations of cultural, religious, or professional character. In multilingual, multicultural societies, where the regime is identified with one of the national groups, cultural manifestations such as the use of languages other than the official language become an expression of opposition. The special position of the Catholic Church in many societies under authoritarian rule and the legal status of many of its organizations in the concordats between the Vatican and the rulers allow priests and laymen a certain autonomy to serve as a channel for opposition sentiments of social classes, cultural minorities, generational unrest, etc., and for the emergence of new leaders. In the case of the Catholic Church the trans-

national character, the moral legitimation of the relatively wide range of ideological positions by the refusal on the part of the Pope to condemn them, the legitimacy for moral prophetic indignation against injustice, particularly after Vaticanum II, together with the concern of the hierarchy for the autonomy of religious organizations and the freedom of priests account for the role of religious groups in the politics of authoritarian regimes. Paradoxically, the Church has provided the regimes through its lay organizations with elites but has also protected its dissidents and occasionally played the role described by Guy Hermet (1973) as tribune against the regime by being witness of moral values against abuses of power. The Church as an institution that will outlast any regime, even those with which it becomes identified in the particular historical moment, is likely to disidentify and regain its autonomy when signs of crisis appear. The same is true for other permanent institutions that might have retained considerable autonomy under authoritarian rule, like the judiciary or even the professional civil servants.

Let us emphasize here that the semioppositions—the alegal but tolerated opposition, the relatively autonomous role of various institutions under conditions of semifreedom—creates a complex political process of far-reaching consequences for the society and its political development. The liberalization of authoritarian regimes can go far, but without a change in the nature of the regime, without the institutionalization of political parties, is likely to be quite limited. The semifreedom under such regimes imposes on their opponents certain costs that are quite different from those of persecution of illegal oppositions and that explain their frustration, disintegration, and sometimes readiness to co-optation, which contribute to the persistence of such regimes sometimes as much as does their repressive capacity. The ambiguity of opposition under authoritarian regimes contrasts with the clear boundaries between regime and its opponents in totalitarian systems. However, let us emphasize that the limited pluralism, the processes of liberalization, and the existence of the tolerated opposition, in the absence of institutional channels for political participation and for the opposition to reach the mass of the population, allow a clear distinction between authoritarian and democratic regimes.

Before closing our general discussion of authoritarian regimes we want to call attention to one difficulty in their study. In a world in which the great and most successful powers are and have been either stable democracies or communist or fascist political systems, with the unique attraction given to them by their ideologies, their organizational capacity, their apparent stability, their success as advanced industrial nations or in overcoming economic backwardness, and their capacity to overcome international second-rank status, authoritarian regimes are in an ambiguous position. None of them has served as a utopian model for other societies, except, perhaps for special historical reasons, Nasser's Egypt in the Arab world. Possibly Mexico, with its combination of the revolutionary myth and the pragmatic stability of its hegemonic party

regime, could serve rulers as a model. None of the authoritarian regimes has fired the imagination of intellectuals and activists across the borders. None has inspired an international of parties supporting such a model. Only the original solutions attempted by the Yugoslavs have created a noncritical interest among intellectuals. Under those circumstances authoritarian regimes and their leaders have felt constrained to take the trappings of the appealing totalitarian models, avoiding or unable to incorporate the substance of the model. Only the thirties, as we shall see, with the ideology of corporatism combining a variety of ideological heritages and linking with Catholic conservative social doctrine, seemed to offer a genuine nontotalitarian and nondemocratic ideological alternative. The visible failure of such systems, the fact that no major power followed that route, the diffuse boundaries between conservative or Catholic corporatism and Italian fascism, and, finally, the disengagement of the Church from its commitment to organic theories of society have ultimately undermined this third model of politics. Authoritarian regimes, whatever their roots in the society, whatever their achievements, are ultimately confronted with two appealing alternative models of polity, which limit the possibilities of full and self-confident institutionalization and give strength to their opponents (Linz, 1973b).

The Problem of a Typology of Authoritarian Regimes

The social science literature offers many ideas for developing typologies of such regimes: Almond and Powell's (1966) distinction of conservative, modernizing, and premobilized authoritarian systems, of which respectively Spain, Brazil, and Ghana would be examples, and the many inchoate typologies in the chapters of Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore (1970) in their analysis of the dynamics of established one-party systems and between revolutionary and established one-party systems. Nor should the pioneer effort of Edward Shils (1960), distinguishing tutelary democracies, modernizing oligarchies, and traditional oligarchies, be forgotten. Giovanni Sartori, in an unpublished study of political parties, with his unexcelled ability to make clear logical distinctions has differentiated the variety of party state systems, that is, noncompetitive-party systems, distinguishing one-party and hegemonic-party systems and, further down on the ladder of abstraction, totalitarian and authoritarian parties, single or hegemonic parties, and finally ideological and pragmatic parties (Sartori, 1970b). The four-fold typology of single-party ideologies of Clement Moore follows.

It is based on a distinction between instrumental and expressive functions, whose operationalization seems to offer certain difficulties. The distinction resulting between totalitarian and chiliastic systems is particularly hazy, and it is not fully clear why the tutelary should be considered instrumental and the administrative expressive (Moore, 1970).

It is, however, far from our intention to dismiss or ignore such typologies

<i>Functions</i>	<i>Transformation Goals</i>	
	Total	Partial
Instrumental	Totalitarian	Tutelary
	Stalinist Russia, Maoist China, Nazi Germany, "Stalinist" East Europe	Tunisia, Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Ataturk's Turkey
	Chiliastic	Administrative
Expressive	Fascist Italy, Nkrumah's Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Cuba, Ben Bella's Algeria	Mexico

that highlight certain aspects of authoritarian regimes and that might be particularly valuable for the analysis of such regimes in the new and old states of the non-Western world or certain cultural areas like Africa south of the Sahara.

Since many authoritarian regimes have been founded by military coups and are headed by military men, it would seem that a typology distinguishing military and nonmilitary authoritarian regimes would be fruitful, distinguishing further the political nature and purpose of the military intervention in assuming power. Certainly the writers on military in politics like Finer (1962) and the many specialists on Latin America and the Middle East have made valuable contributions to our understanding of authoritarian regimes. However, a category of military authoritarian regimes would include too many, quite different regimes, as the mention of the names of Ataturk, Pétain, Franco, Perón, Nasser, Odria, Medici, and Cárdenas suggests. Military regimes, with some significant and interesting exceptions, undergo a process of civilization, if they are stable, and the military origin or military background of the head of state does not tell us enough about their nature. Military men can carry out a deep cultural revolution like Ataturk, important social and economic changes like Nasser, displace traditional regimes like they did or prevent a continuing process of change toward democracy and perhaps social revolution after a break with tradition with a counterrevolutionary intent, like Franco. Certainly the military mentality of men at the top would give such regimes certain common features, which, however important, are not sufficient for any meaningful typology.

Scholars are likely to be confused in studying authoritarian regimes because of the frequent inauthenticity of their claims. Since the founding group or leader has no or few ideological commitments before taking power except some vague ideas about defending order, uniting the country, modernizing the nation, overthrowing a corrupt regime, or rejecting foreign influences, they find themselves without ideological justification, without ideas attractive to the

intellectuals, removed from the mainstream of international ideological confrontations. In that vacuum the rulers will search for acceptable symbols and ideas to incorporate them into their *arcana imperi*. Those ideas are likely to be the ones dominant at the time and congruent with the "march of history." It is no accident that Ataturk should have chosen progressive, secularist, democratic ideas and symbols; that the Eastern European royal dictators, bureaucrats, and officers, and Franco, should have mimicked fascism; that contemporary authoritarian regimes should claim to be socialist and to introduce "democratic centralism" or "participatory democracy" and "workers' councils" rather than corporatism. No scholar should accept such claims at face value—not that the claims are irrelevant, since such initially vague commitments largely condition the international response to such regimes and influence their later development, opening certain possibilities and excluding others (Linz, 1973b). However, it would be dangerous to base our classifications on those claims. Actual policies and the operation of political institutions might be very similar despite such pseudoideological differences, and the similarity in mentality of the rulers might make possible an understanding and affinity between leaders of systems apparently dissimilar.

The ideological elements used, far from central to the understanding of such systems, would allow us to distinguish the following main types.

1. Authoritarian regimes claiming to carry out basic processes of modernization, particularly secularization and educational reforms, to create the preconditions for constitutional democracy like that of the more successful Western nations. Regimes born in the eve of World War I, like Turkey and Mexico, were committed to such a pattern, which was reflected in the institutional rules, ignored in practice, but ultimately is making possible an evolution in that direction.
2. Fascist or semifascist-nationalist authoritarian regimes.
3. Authoritarian regimes that we shall characterize as "organic statism," attempting to link with the Catholic corporatist social doctrine mixed with fascist elements but distinct from the fascist-populist-nationalist totalitarian conceptions. Often these types of regimes that attempt to institutionalize a particular type of pluralism have been confused with fascism, and the term "clerical fascism" reflects both the bias of the observers and the ambiguity of that type of authoritarianism in the late twenties and early thirties.
4. The authoritarian regimes born in the aftermath of World War II in the newly independent states claiming to pursue a different national way toward participation, including a single party or subordinating the existing parties, characterizing their regimes as tutelary democracies, like Sukarno in Indonesia, or institutionalizing "basic democracies" in Pakistan.
5. More recently, African new nations and Islamic countries rejecting traditional religious conceptions of authority, impressed by the success of com-

munist countries and sometimes searching for their sympathy, have claimed to be socialist, to build mass parties and to reject Western individualism for a new sense of community based on identification with the leader and the party. In the case of Islamic countries an attempt has been made to link those ideological imitations with a genuine national cultural tradition, the Islamic notion of community, sometimes fusing modern ideas with traditional religious conceptions. It is no accident that some political scientists like James Gregor should have noted some of the similarities between African socialism (and similar ideologies) and fascism in semideveloped agrarian societies in the thirties (Gregor, 1968 and 1974a).

6. Communist posttotalitarian authoritarian regimes, described by Gordon Skilling as "consultative authoritarianism, quasi-pluralistic authoritarianism, democratizing and pluralistic authoritarianism and anarchic authoritarianism."

Despite the usefulness of the six types briefly delineated above, except for the sixth one, I would argue that this is not the most fruitful approach to the development of a typology of authoritarian regimes as defined above.

Toward a Typology of Authoritarian Regimes

If our definition is useful, it should also allow us to develop subtypes of such regimes. The limited pluralism, as opposed to the tendency toward monism, should lead us to typologies taking into account which institutions and groups are allowed to participate and in what way, and which ones are excluded. If rejection of mobilization along totalitarian lines or failure to achieve such mobilization distinguishes such regimes from totalitarianism, the reasons for and the nature of the limited mobilization should provide another dimension of a typology. Since mentalities in contrast to ideologies are elusive to study, that dimension, particularly due to the importance of mimicking of ideologies, should turn out in practice to be less helpful. Even when in theory it should provide important elements for typologies.

The limited pluralism of authoritarian regimes takes a variety of forms, and within it different groups or institutions take a more or less preeminent place. (The participation of groups in political power is controlled by certain social forces and channeled through different organizational structures.) On that account authoritarian regimes range from those dominated by a bureaucratic-military-technocratic elite that preexisted the regime, to a large extent, to others in which there is a privileged political participation and entry into the elite through a single or dominant party emerging from the society. In other regimes we find that a variety of social groups and institutions defined by the state are created or allowed to participate in one or another degree in the political process under the forms we shall call organic statism, which often is ideologically described as corporatism or organic democracy. A very special