

Douglas J. Feith Remarks

Under Secretary of Defense of the United States

Speech

On the web: <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020421-Feith.html>

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Remarks by Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, at American Israel Public Affairs Committee

Remarks by Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, April 21, 2002.

It's good to have the opportunity once again to address an AIPAC annual conference.

I'd like to talk with you about the war on terrorism -- America's war and Israel's war. I'll take my lead from the current headlines and start with the Middle East.

Day after day, we read of attacks targeted at Israeli civilians.

The suicide bombers -- or, homicide bombers, as President Bush calls them -- have a political cause. But the systematic killing of ordinary people going about their lives with their children in shopping malls, on buses, at restaurants -- is not politics. It's not even war. It's deranged ideology in action. At stake is not just the fate of a particular country, but the fate of all open societies.

The intentional mass murder of civilians, including children, forces us to speak in moral terms about basic ideas -- about good and evil.

President Bush states the case starkly: Terrorism is evil.

The suicide bombers who kill Israelis, like those who attacked the World Trade Center and Pentagon last September 11th, are enemies of the idea of humanity. They may claim to represent a good people or a worthy cause, but they taint the political platforms they embrace. It's immoral to seek excuses for terrorism and harmful to reward it. So the message of responsible governments should be unwavering: terrorists do not advance their causes; rather, they lose ground.

The Palestinian people are long suffering. They have profound grievances against many who have done them harm and served them ill throughout the Middle East, and not just in Israel.

The Palestinians have been damaged severely for a century or so by leaders who have time and again made disastrous strategic choices -- from siding with the Nazis in World War II to siding with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, to siding with Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. The question now is: What side are they on in the current global war against terrorism? People always pay a price when their leaders fail them. The Palestinian people have paid, and continue to pay, such a price. It is a tragedy.

Referring to Yasir Arafat, President Bush has said, "He's missed his opportunities, and thereby betrayed the hopes of the people he's supposed to lead. Given his failure, the Israeli government feels it must strike at terrorist networks that are killing its citizens".

President Bush then added, "Yet, Israel must understand that its response to these recent attacks is only a temporary measure. All parties have their own responsibilities. And all parties owe it to their own people to act".

Despite the current fighting, the President still envisions Israel and the Palestinians achieving a peace by mutual consent. He stresses that this will require compromises and "hard choices" regarding territorial and other claims and desires of Israelis and Palestinians. The achievement of a negotiated peace settlement would bring an end to the issues of legitimacy, borders, settlements and occupation.

The President has declared, "We have no illusions about the difficulty of the issues that lie ahead. Yet, our nation's resolve is strong. America is committed to ending this conflict and beginning an era of peace".

Many Palestinians say that their aim is to live dignified lives, in freedom, in peace and prosperity in their own state. That goal could be achieved. The U.S. government supports it. Israeli leaders have for years acknowledged that a Palestinian state will be the ultimate outcome of any negotiated peace. As President Bush noted on April 4th, "Israel has recognized the goal of a Palestinian state. The outlines of a just settlement are clear: two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side, in peace and security".

But that goal grows increasingly remote as terrorism belies and precludes diplomacy -- and darkens the Palestinian people's future.

President Bush has called on Israelis to show "a respect for and concern about the dignity of the Palestinian people who are and will be their neighbors. It is crucial [the President noted] to distinguish between the terrorists and ordinary Palestinians seeking to provide for their own families".

The Palestinians could help themselves by acknowledging that their worst enemies are those who inspire, finance, equip, excuse and otherwise encourage children to commit homicide bombings.

The major state supporters of terrorism -- Iraq, Syria and Iran -- offer incentives to encourage such bombings, host terrorist headquarters and supply the arms and explosives. Clerics, who

should be faithful trustees of God's word, violate their trust by legitimating suicide and calling murderers "martyrs."

The cult of suicide and murder is sustained through the education of children to hate and to aspire to become suicide bombers. That cult is fostered by those who praise terrorists as "heroes" and those who rationalize terrorism as the understandable act of the politically frustrated. This includes prominent statesmen from many countries who should know better.

The sad reality is that there are politically frustrated people throughout the Middle East and the broader world. Political, religious and other leaders who craft excuses for terrorism are sowing the wind. It is deadly recklessness.

The United States is fighting terrorism, using the full range of tools at our disposal, military and non-military. We'll continue to confront terrorism on the military battlefield, but equally importantly on the battlefield of ideas.

Winning the war requires us to help change the way people think. This can be done. Worldwide moral battles can be fought and won. For example, no decent person any more -- no one who hopes to be recognized as respectable in the wider world -- supports or excuses slave trading, piracy or genocide. No decent person should support or excuse terrorism either.

Our initial victory in Afghanistan deprived al Qaeda of its safe haven and infrastructure there. We daily learn more about that infrastructure -- its administrative apparatus, training facilities and laboratories in which al Qaeda worked to develop biological and other weapons of mass destruction.

For now, at least, the al Qaeda leadership is on the defensive -- some are in captivity; the rest are on the run.

With a few exceptions, such as Iraq, most countries now wish -- at least they now profess to wish -- to be associated with our global war against terrorism. But at the same time, we see this upsurge in terrorism directed against Israel and brazen public support for anti-Israel terrorism, especially suicide bombings, even from seasoned, sophisticated officials.

Which brings us to the dangers of intellectual as well as military passivity in the face of terrorism.

For three decades or so, the world grew tolerant of terrorism. Many belittled the problem: Recall the famous phrase that commonly passed for sophisticated discourse: "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Some countries supported terrorism -- perhaps not openly, but often without even bothering to cover their tracks. As terrorists racked up a large civilian death toll in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, they and their causes often flourished diplomatically and politically.

The forces of civilized humanity did not take the offensive against terrorism; rarely went after terrorist groups root and branch; failed to coerce the state sponsors of terrorism to stop; never overthrew a regime because it supported terrorism.

But September 11th was a turning point. That attack made it clear that the United States and other open societies required a new approach: We recognized that our countries are too big, too open, too full of high-value targets for us to defend them against terrorists. We had to take the offensive.

The action of US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan has already altered the intellectual atmosphere favorably. Some states that had winked at or even supported terrorism are modifying their policies. In some countries, the policy changes don't necessarily reflect a change of heart. But in others, such as Pakistan, the changes have been dramatic and appear to signify a true strategic redirection.

The United States will stay on the offensive against terrorism -- targeting the terrorists themselves and, where necessary, coercing the states that support or tolerate them. Much of our work in this war is less dramatic than the liberation of Afghanistan. While other actions may once again involve larger-scale US military operations, our current work around the world, including in the Middle East, involves foreign military anti-terrorism training and international law enforcement, the freezing of bank accounts, intelligence and diplomatic activity and so forth.

Our ultimate goal is to change the international environment regarding terrorism-- instead of tolerance, an international norm of renunciation and repudiation of terrorism. As I said, we want the world to view terrorism as it views piracy, slave trading or genocide -- activities universally repudiated by respectable people. This is not an abstract, philosophical, academic point, but a strategic purpose of great practical significance.

As we continue the US offensive against terrorism, we have in mind not only the more familiar kinds of terrorism.

As horrifying as September 11th was, the anthrax attacks that occurred later --though small in scale -- warned us that terrorists using weapons of mass destruction -- biological agents, or chemical, nuclear or radiological weapons -- are an even greater threat.

When he spoke of state supporters of terrorism that are developing weapons of mass destruction, President Bush said in his State of the Union message that, "they could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic".

Our goal therefore must be, as the President stated, "to prevent regimes that sponsor terrorism from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction".

Also in that speech, President Bush declared, "The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons".

So far, I've focused on terrorism as a political tool and the danger that terrorists could acquire weapons of mass destruction.

I'd like to conclude with some thoughts about the sources of terrorism.

It's often argued that the phenomenon of suicide bombers -- terrorists who perform attacks that they know they cannot survive -- demonstrates that we aren't dealing with people who calculate the benefits and costs of their actions.

In this vein, we frequently hear that suicide bombing is the product of the combination of poverty and hopelessness.

Westerners -- we whom Usama bin Laden has sneeringly referred to as "lovers of life" -- cannot easily understand how a young man (or woman) straps on several pounds of high explosive and then blows himself up in a crowd of civilians. We assume that only a person ensnared in deep despair could do such a thing.

This diagnosis implies its own solution -- that the world should address what is called the "root causes of terrorism," the poverty and political hopelessness that many people imagine are the traits and motives of the suicide bombers. This diagnosis, however, doesn't jibe with actual experience. And it blinds us to opportunities we have to confront terrorism strategically.

When we look at the records of the suicide bombers, we see that many aren't drawn from the poor. Mohammed Atta, for instance -- a key figure in executing the September 11 attack -- was a middle-class Egyptian whose parents were able to send him to study abroad. And his education meant that he could look forward to a relatively privileged life in Egypt -- hardly grounds for extreme despair.

Indeed, as we learn from a recent New York Times interview with Hamas leaders in Gaza, what characterizes the suicide bombers -- and especially the old men who send them off on their missions -- is rather hope than despair:

First of all, the bombers cherish a perverse form of religious hope. The promise of eternity in paradise is a tenet of many faiths, a noble incentive and consolation to millions of people. It's as cynical as it is sinister that leaders of al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas and other groups convince young people that eternity in paradise is available as a reward for the murder of innocents.

Second, there is the bomber's hope of earthly glory and reward -- praise as a hero from political leaders and honor for one's parents and a \$25,000 check to the bomber's family from Saddam Hussein. President Bush has condemned, "[t]hose governments, like Iraq, that reward parents for the sacrifice of their children "....

Those who encourage homicide bombing, as the President said, "are guilty of soliciting murder of the worst kind".

Third, there is the homicide bomber's political hope. As that New York Times interview makes clear, Palestinian extremists think they have finally discovered a winning strategy.

The recent outpouring of open support in the Arab world for homicide bombers -- from Mrs. Arafat, from a senior Arab diplomat, from clerics associated with prestigious universities -- reflects excitement at the thought that bombings are producing success. It is the kind of triumphalism characteristic of a mentality that believes in "the worse the better."

This suggests a strategic course for us: attack the sources of these malignant hopes.

Regarding the religious hope: Many Islamic religious leaders seem uncomfortable with suicide bombing -- but many of them have been silenced or intimidated to voice support for the terrorists. The civilized world should exert itself to support moderate clerics, defend them and provide them with platforms to protect their religion from extremists who want to distort and hijack it.

The civilized world should also deal with political leaders who heap honor (and money) on the suicide bombers and their families. President Bush, speaking of suicide bombers, said: "They are not martyrs. They are murderers." Other world leaders have the responsibility to reinforce this message.

Finally, as to the suicide bombers' political hopes, we must ensure that terrorism is not seen as a winning strategy. This is today's immediate challenge: For example, we have to make it understood that the Palestinian homicide bombers are harming, not helping, their political cause.

Peace can be achieved when the conditions are right: and the most important condition is the state of peoples' minds. Thus, we must take seriously the incitement to hatred that creates the intellectual atmosphere in which terrorism can flourish. If we seek the "root cause" of terrorism, this is where we'll find it.

Peace diplomacy in the Middle East has been an intense activity for decades. It's now clear that we have not focused enough attention on the relationship between peace and education. We spend a great deal of attention on what diplomats say to each other. We need to pay closer attention to what teachers instill in their students. Therein lies the key to peace.

Changing the intellectual fashions in the world regarding terrorism -- and ultimately delegitimizing it altogether, without regard to the various causes espoused by the terrorists -- won't be easy. But its importance as a strategic requirement is right up there with the destruction and disruption of terrorist operational infrastructure.

The Bush administration appreciates the complexity of its tasks -- in the war on terrorism and in Middle East diplomacy. The President approaches these tasks with the steadiness and energy appropriate to the magnitude of the stakes.

We have our nation and its liberties to protect, our friends to assist, and our adversaries to deter and defeat. This is a rare period of flux in world affairs. We have opportunities to do good for

ourselves and for others -- in the Middle East and other regions of the world -- by enhancing security, suppressing terrorism, eliminating weapons of mass destruction, promoting freedom and prosperity and opening paths to peace. The American people expect this administration to rise to the occasion. We shall do our best.

Thank you.

Speech

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Speech By Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy To the American Jewish Committee

Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, To the American Jewish Committee Washington, D.C., May 8, 2002.

Fighting Terrorism

Good morning. Nice to be here. I have a number of friends in this American Jewish Committee audience.

I'd like to talk with you about the war on terrorism – to discuss the progress of the war and share some thoughts about its nature, our objectives and our strategy.

Our enemy in the war on terrorism is not a state or a group of states. Our enemy is not organized as a conventional military force. We cannot define victory as the conquering and subduing of a particular piece of territory or a people. We cannot expect that our own territory will be spared major damage so long as our armed forces remain undefeated. This is indeed a most unusual war – different from any that we fought in the past.

We're fighting not a nation but a terrorist network – one might even say a network of networks, an amorphous structure present in many countries, including those of our allies, and in the United States itself.

So it's a complicated struggle on multiple fronts. And we can't rely on conventional armed power to the extent we relied on such means in past wars. That's why administration officials so often stress that we must bring to bear the full range of instruments of US national power, including intelligence, financial, diplomatic and, not least, moral, as well as military tools.

Fundamental to our strategy is the recognition that we can't just defend ourselves at our own borders. We have no choice but to take the offensive.

Our country is too big, too vulnerable too full of tall building for us to do otherwise.

We're vulnerable because of the kind of country we are:

- We're open to the world for commerce, travel and communications.
- We welcome people from all over and let them live their lives as they wish, building their own institutions, practicing their own religion, living according to their own lights.
- We respect people as individuals and afford them a large degree of privacy.
- Accordingly, we have constraints against the surveillance of domestic groups.

That is the kind of country we are and that is the kind of country we want to be. If we're to preserve our freedom and our way of life, we must play offense, not defense against terrorism. We must destroy terrorism at its sources:

First of all, we have to deny terrorists a secure base of operations – a safe haven where they can recruit and train more terrorists, plan operations, acquire equipment and supplies, where they can rest and regroup after terrorist attacks.

In some cases, this means the United States will cooperate with friendly governments, helping them make their authority effective over their entire territory. Examples are the Philippines, Yemen and Georgia.

In other cases, it means forcing regimes to stop supporting terrorists or providing safe haven to them.

- We demanded that the Taliban stop supporting the al Qaida terrorist organization.
- When they refused, we took decisive action to rid Afghanistan of the terrorists and those who supported them.

Our action in Afghanistan has already constructively perturbed the atmosphere of toleration of terrorism.

Many states that had been tolerant of terrorism, or not at all active in fighting it, have changed their policy.

In some cases, the change in behavior does not bespeak a change of heart. Some regimes may simply fear that they could become the next Taliban – they may believe that, for now at least, it's prudent at least to appear to be cooperating in the war on terrorism.

- But in other countries, such as Pakistan, the change has been dramatic and, we think, reflects a genuine desire to take a new and better path.

But, as I said, we're fighting a widespread network – one present even in countries where the governments oppose terrorism.

Pressing our offensive, therefore, now involves many actions that are less dramatic than the war in Afghanistan has been:

- For example, law enforcement activities, the freezing of bank accounts, interception of the movement of terrorists from one country to another or the interception of shipments of weapons or money.

But we don't rule out additional military actions, directed against unrelenting state sponsors of terrorism.

As President Bush said in his State of the Union speech, we must pay particular attention to states that have supported terrorism and are developing weapons of mass destruction.

- These states, the President said,

could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic...

So, as the President stated:

The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.

Ultimately, our goal is to change the international environment concerning terrorism.

We should confront an unpleasant fact: **During the past three decades or so, there developed in the world an atmosphere of tolerance for terrorism.**

- Many excused it: in one famous phrase that often passed for sophisticated discourse: "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter"
- Some countries supported it – perhaps not openly, but often without even bothering to cover their tracks.
- There were important failings in this regard all around the world, including in the United States.

In place of this atmosphere of tolerance, the United States aims now to establish an international norm of intolerance of terrorism.

In short, we want the international community to view terrorism as it now views piracy, slave-trading or genocide – activities that no-one who aspires to respectability can tolerate, let alone support.

This takes us into the realm of ideas.

It's important that we state our case clearly, even bluntly.

- As President Bush has declared: "Terrorism is evil."
- However much the language of morality elicits sniffs from some of our sophisticated critics abroad and at home, we don't flinch from using it. Moral clarity is a strategic asset.

It'll take time to reverse the pernicious effects of the last several decades – but we'll be steadfast in making our case.

- It bears noting that military victory – while not exactly a logical argument – does have its uses in the battle of ideas.
- After all, in the 1930s, fascism, despite (perhaps because of) its inhumanity, had a strong intellectual following. It was in vogue and its influence spread throughout Europe years before Nazi military conquests began. It wasn't defeated solely – or even primarily – by arguments, but by Allied tanks and bombers. Nothing fails like failure. Ideas associated with catastrophe for their adherents tend eventually, if not suddenly, to lose influence.

But there's a second aspect of the war of ideas that I want to address – and I think it's more significant:

- An important ideological source of global terrorism is an extremist interpretation of Islam that emphasizes intolerance and brutality in religious matters and hatred of the West in political matters.

This extremist school perverts the humane ideals of Islam.

- But unfortunately, it has much resonance in the Islamic world.

There's a struggle going on within Islam. Non-Moslems are not parties as such in this struggle. But the whole civilized world has an interest in helping those in the Moslem world who reject extremism and espouse the more moderate, tolerant, peaceful kind of Islam.

- The moderate kind of Islam flourishes in many Islamic countries.
- Two especially significant examples are Turkey, which stands out as a predominantly Moslem country that has a democratic form of government and is a longstanding and valuable ally of the United States,
- And Indonesia, the country whose Muslim majority is the largest in the world.

The Western world has a large stake in the prosperity and stability and overall success of such countries.

Unfortunately, extremist Islam has been making inroads around the world lately. It has large financial resources, which its adherents use

- to finance, and hence control, Islamic institutions, especially schools, throughout the world
- to propagate hatred of the West and the notion of inevitable warfare between Islam and the West, and
- to support terrorism – that is, to legitimate violence against innocent people.

The Western world has an interest in helping the moderate voices of Islam to be heard, and to protect them against retaliation.

I would like to close with a few words concerning the campaign of suicide bombing which has been waged against Israel in recent weeks – the most salient problem on the anti-terrorism agenda at present.

It's often argued that the phenomenon of suicide bombers -- terrorists who perform attacks that they know they cannot survive -- demonstrates that we aren't dealing with people who calculate the benefits and costs of their actions.

In this vein, we frequently hear that suicide bombing is the product of the combination of poverty and hopelessness.

Westerners -- we whom Usama bin Laden has sneeringly referred to as "lovers of life" -- cannot easily understand how a young man (or woman) straps on several pounds of high explosive and then blows himself up in a crowd of civilians. We assume that only a person ensnared by deep despair could do such a thing.

- **This diagnosis implies its own solution -- that the world should address what is called the "root causes of terrorism," the poverty and political hopelessness that many people imagine are the traits and motives of the suicide bombers.**
- **This diagnosis, however, doesn't jibe with actual experience. And it misleads us about the wisest strategy.**

When we look at the records of the suicide bombers, we see that many aren't drawn from the poor.

- **Mohammed Atta, for instance -- a key figure in executing the September 11 attack -- was a middle-class Egyptian whose parents were able to send him to study abroad. And his education meant that he could look forward to a relatively privileged life in Egypt -- hardly grounds for extreme despair.**

Indeed, as we learn from a recent New York Times interview with Hamas leaders in Gaza, what characterizes the suicide bombers -- and especially the old men who send them off on their missions -- is rather hope than despair:

First of all, the bombers cherish a perverse form of religious hope. The promise of eternity in paradise is a tenet of many faiths, a noble incentive and consolation to millions of people. It's as cynical as it is sinister that leaders of al Qaida, Hezbollah, Hamas and other groups convince young people that eternity in paradise is available as a reward for the murder of innocents.

Second, there is the bomber's hope of earthly glory and reward -- praise as a hero from political leaders and honor for one's parents and a \$25,000 check to the bomber's family from Saddam Hussein. President Bush has condemned

[t]hose governments, like Iraq, that reward parents for the sacrifice of their children

Those who encourage homicide bombing, as the President said,

are guilty of soliciting murder of the worst kind.

Third, there is the homicide bomber's political hope. As that New York Times interview makes clear, Palestinian extremists think they have finally discovered a winning strategy.

The recent outpouring of open support in the Arab world for homicide bombers -- from Mrs. Arafat, from a senior Arab diplomat, from clerics associated with prestigious universities -- reflects excitement at the thought that bombings are producing success. It is the kind of triumphalism characteristic of a mentality that believes in "the worse the better."

This suggests a strategic course for us: attack the sources of these malignant hopes.

Regarding the religious hope: Many Islamic religious leaders seem uncomfortable with suicide bombing -- but many of them have been silenced or intimidated to voice support for the terrorists. As I have mentioned, the civilized world should exert itself to support moderate clerics, defend them and provide them with platforms to protect their religion from extremists who want to distort and hijack it.

The civilized world should also deal with political leaders who heap honor (and money) on the suicide bombers and their families. President Bush, speaking of suicide bombers, said: "They are not martyrs. They are murderers." Other world leaders have the responsibility to reinforce this message.

Finally, as to the suicide bombers' political hopes, we must ensure that terrorism is not seen as a winning strategy. This is today's immediate challenge: For example, we have to make

it understood that the Palestinian homicide bombers are harming, not helping, their political cause.

Arab-Israeli peace is a goal craved by all decent people. The Bush administration is engaged in the pursuit of this goal.

We recognize that peace can be achieved only when the conditions are right: and the most important condition is the state of peoples' minds. Thus, we must take seriously the incitement to hatred that creates the intellectual atmosphere in which terrorism can flourish. If we seek the "root cause" of terrorism, this is where we'll find it.

Peace diplomacy in the Middle East has been an intense activity for decades. It's now clear that we have not focused enough attention on the relationship between peace and education. We spend a great deal of attention on what diplomats say to each other. We need to pay closer attention to what teachers instill in their students. Therein lies the key to peace.

Changing the intellectual fashions in the world regarding terrorism -- and ultimately de-legitimizing it altogether, without regard to the various causes espoused by the terrorists -- won't be easy. But its importance as a strategic requirement is right up there with the destruction and disruption of terrorist operational infrastructure.

The Bush administration appreciates the complexity of its tasks -- in the war on terrorism and in Middle East diplomacy. The President approaches these tasks with the steadiness and energy appropriate to the magnitude of the stakes.

We have our nation and its liberties to protect, our friends to assist, and our adversaries to deter and defeat. This is a rare period of flux in world affairs. We have opportunities to do good for ourselves and for others -- in the Middle East and other regions of the world -- by enhancing security, suppressing terrorism, eliminating weapons of mass destruction, promoting freedom and prosperity and opening paths to peace. The American people expect this administration to rise to the occasion. We shall do our best.

Thank you.

Speech

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Council on Foreign Relations: Progress in the Global War on Terrorism

By Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith, Washington, DC, Thursday, November 13, 2003.

My talk is about the war on terrorism. I'd like to start with a personal story.

September 11 in Moscow

On September 11, 2001, I was in Moscow with my colleague J.D. Crouch, discussing the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an ancient text. As we were leaving the Defense Ministry in the late afternoon, the world entered a new era, for that was when the first plane hit the World Trade Center.

We asked the US European Command for the means to get back to Washington despite the general shutdown of US air traffic. EUCOM provided us a KC-135 tanker, which met us in Germany. We collected there a handful of other stray Defense Department officials also stranded by the suspension of commercial air traffic to the US. These included Under Secretary Dov Zakheim; Assistant Secretary Peter Rodman and his deputy, Bill Luti; and General John Abizaid, then on the Joint Staff and now Tommy Franks' successor as the Commander of the Central Command. All of us were frustrated to be away at such a moment and grateful to be getting back fast to the Pentagon, which was still smoldering.

Strategizing at 30,000 Feet

In the KC-135, we conferred and wrote papers about how to comprehend the September 11 attack as a matter of national security policy.

President Bush's statements even then showed that he thought of the attack, in essence, as an act of war, rather than a law enforcement matter. That point may now seem unremarkable, but think back to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and to the attacks on Khobar Towers in 1996, on the US East Africa embassies in 1998 and on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000. When such attacks occurred over the last decades, US officials avoided the term "war." The primary response was to dispatch the FBI to identify individuals for prosecution. Recognizing the September 11 attack as war was a departure from established practice. It was President Bush's seminal insight, the wisdom of which is attested by the fact that it looks so obvious in retrospect.

We in the KC-135 chewed over such questions as what it means to be at war not with a conventional enemy but with a network of terrorist organizations and their state sponsors. How should we formulate our war aims – how define victory? What should be our strategy?

As we mulled all this, the airplane's crew invited us to the cockpit to look down on the southern tip of Manhattan. We saw smoke rising from the ruins of the twin towers. Aside from sadness and anger, the smoke engendered an enduring sense of duty to do everything one could to prevent further attacks.

When we landed in Washington on September 12 we were primed to join the work the President had already gotten underway to develop a strategy for the war.

That work has held up well since September 2001.

The President and his advisors considered the nature of the threat. If terrorists exploited the open nature of our society to attack us repeatedly, the American people might feel compelled to change that nature – to close it – to defend ourselves. Many defensive measures come at a high price – that is, interference with our freedom of movement, intrusions on our privacy, inspections and an undesirable, however necessary, rebalancing of civil liberties against the interests of public safety. In other words, at stake in the war on terrorism are not just the lives and limbs of potential victims, but our country's freedom.

It isn't possible to prevent all terrorist attacks; there are simply too many targets in the United States to defend – too many tall buildings. It's possible, however, to fight terrorism in a way that preserves our freedom and culture. So the conclusion was that our war aim should be "to eliminate terrorism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society."

Because the United States can't count on preserving our way of life by means of a defensive strategy, there was and is no practical alternative to a strategy of offense. We have to reach out and hit the terrorists where they reside, plan and train, and not wait to try to defeat their plans while they are executing them on US soil. To deal with the threat from the terrorists, we have to change the way *we* live or change the way *they* live.

The Three-Part Strategy

Accordingly, the President's strategy in the war on terrorism has three parts. One is disrupting and destroying terrorists and their infrastructure. This involves direct military action, but also intelligence, law enforcement and financial regulatory activity.

The list of senior members of al Qaida and affiliated groups who have been killed or captured since 9/11 is impressive and includes such key figures as:

- Khalid Shaykh Mohammad;
- Abu Zubaydah;
- Hambali; and,
- Mohammad Atef.

These and other successes against the terrorists demonstrate that international cooperation is alive, well and effective. We've worked jointly with the Philippines, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Spain, France, Jordan, Morocco and Egypt, among others.

From our interrogations of detainees we know that the absence of large-scale attacks on the United States since 9/11 has not been for want of bad intentions and effort on the terrorists' part. We have been disrupting their plans and operations. Our strategy of offense – which is to say, forcing the terrorists to play defense – is sound.

The second part of our strategy targets the recruitment and indoctrination of terrorists. The objective is to create a global intellectual and moral environment hostile to terrorism. We refer to this part as "the battle of ideas." As the President's National Strategy for Combating Terrorism puts it: We want terrorism "viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy or genocide: behavior that no respectable government can condone or support and all must oppose." This requires a sustained effort to de-legitimate terrorism, and to promote the success of those forces, especially within the Moslem world, that are working to build and preserve modern, moderate and democratic political and educational institutions.

And the third part of the strategy, of course, is securing the homeland. The Bush Administration has created the Department of Homeland Security, while the Defense Department has organized a new Northern Command in which, for the first time, a combatant commander has the entire continental United States within his area of responsibility. And we are in the process, also for the first time, of fielding defenses against ballistic missiles of all ranges.

Coalitions

Our strategy envisions international cooperation. The war is global. We have forged formidable, adaptable partnerships -- a rolling set, because some coalition partners are comfortable helping in some areas, but not in others.

After 9/11, nearly a hundred nations joined us in one or more aspect of the war on terrorism -- in military operations against al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan; in maritime interdiction operations; in financial crackdowns against terrorists funding; in law enforcement actions; in intelligence-sharing; and in diplomatic efforts.

In Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan, there are 71 members of the coalition; including contributors to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 37 countries have contributed military assets. In Iraq, 32 countries are now contributing forces.

The Terrorist/State Sponsor/WMD Nexus

As President Bush noted early on, the war's greatest strategic danger remains the possibility that terrorists will obtain chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. The list of states that sponsor terrorism correlates obviously and ominously with the list of those that have programs to produce such weapons of mass destruction.

The nexus of terrorist groups, state sponsors of terrorism, and WMD is the security nightmare of the 21st century. It remains our focus. We are treating this threat as a compelling danger *in the near term*. We are not waiting for it to become "imminent," for we cannot expect to receive unambiguous warning of, for example, a terrorist group's acquisition of biological weapons agents.

We know the list of terrorist-sponsoring states with WMD programs -- Iran, Syria, Libya and North Korea. Iraq used to be in that category, but no longer is.

Iraq – The Case for Action

Iraq under Saddam Hussein was a sadistic tyranny that developed and used weapons of mass destruction, launched aggressive attacks and wars against Iran, Kuwait, Israel and Saudi Arabia and supported terrorists by providing them with safe harbor, funds, training and other help. It had defied a long list of legally binding UN Security Council resolutions. It undid the UN inspection regime of the 1990s. It eviscerated the economic sanctions regime. And it shot virtually daily at the US and British aircraft patrolling Iraq's northern and southern no-fly zones. In sum, containment of Saddam Hussein's Iraq was a hollow hope.

The best information available from intelligence sources said that (1) Saddam Hussein had chemical and biological weapons and was pursuing nuclear weapons, and (2) if Saddam Hussein obtained fissile material from outside Iraq, as opposed to having to produce it indigenously, he could have had a nuclear weapon within a year.

Those assessments, and most of the underlying information, were *not* recent products of the intelligence community. They were consistent with the intelligence that pre-dated the Administration of George W. Bush. And they were consistent with the intelligence from cooperative foreign services and with United Nations estimates of weapons unaccounted-for.

It was reasonable, indeed necessary, for the US government to rely on the best information it had available. And while we haven't yet found (and may not find) stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons in Iraq, David Kay reports that the Iraq Survey Group has obtained corroborative evidence of Saddam's nuclear, chemical and biological programs, covert laboratories, advanced missile programs and Iraq's program (active right up to the start of the war) to conceal WMD-related developments from the UN inspectors.

The Iraqi dictator posed a serious threat. Given the nature of that threat, seen in light of our experience with the surprise attack of 9/11 and the crumbling, one after another, of the pillars of containment, it would have been risky in the extreme to have allowed him to remain in power for the indefinite future. Intelligence is never perfect. But that is not grounds for inaction in the face of the kind of information the President had about Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

Saddam's demise has freed Iraqis of a tyrant, deprived terrorists of a financier and supporter, eliminated a threat to regional stability, taken Iraq off the list of rogue states with WMD programs and created a new opportunity for free political institutions to arise in the Arab world. All of this serves our cause in the Global War on Terrorism.

Experiments in democratization

In Iraq and Afghanistan, democratization has begun. Success will strengthen the forces of moderation in the Muslim world. It could create a new era in the Middle East. Already, since Iraq's liberation, talk of reform and democracy is more common and more intense in the Arab world. It would be desirable if the Middle East reached a political turning point similar to the points in history when Asian democracy and Latin American democracy blossomed and spread rapidly.

As the President said last week at the National Endowment for Democracy: "It should be clear to all that Islam – the faith of one-fifth of humanity – is consistent with democratic rule. Democratic progress is found in many predominantly Muslim countries ... More than half of all Muslims in the world live in freedom under democratically constituted governments."

Opposition to democratic rule motivates extremists in both Afghanistan and Iraq to try to tear down the newly formed institutions. They see the potential for modernization, democratization and liberalization of the economy and they oppose and fear what they see.

Extremism of the type that fuels terrorism is a political phenomenon. It's driven by ideology and ideologies, we know, can be defeated. Like Soviet Communism and Nazism, radical Islamism can be discredited by failure.

When the Soviet system collapsed, it helped demonstrate that our nation's positive message -- individual liberty, the rule of law, tolerance and peace -- has global appeal. Soviet communism was discredited practically and morally by its ultimately undeniable failures to deliver goodness or happiness. Radical Islamism -- an ideological stew of historical resentments, political hatreds, religious intolerance and violence -- can be expected to have a similar end. Like communism, it promises a utopia that it can't deliver.

As the President noted: "Many Middle Eastern governments now understand that military dictatorships and theocratic rule are a straight, smooth highway to nowhere. ... The good and capable people of the Middle East all deserve responsible leadership. For too long, many people in that region have been victims and subjects -- they deserve to be active citizens."

In Afghanistan and Iraq -- as well as elsewhere in the region -- this process has begun.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan has a way to go before it achieves a stable, permanent government. Taliban forces are working to regroup and attack, often from bases in the rough terrain of the tribal areas just across the Pakistan border. Afghanistan's central government needs more skilled administrators. It needs better control over the country's customs revenues. And important open questions remain as to the right relationship between the central government and the local governors and military commanders.

But Afghanistan has come far since its liberation from the Taliban only two years ago. President Karzai is increasingly extending the government's authority across the country:

- President Karzai has replaced about one-third of the provincial governors.
- Reform of the Defense Ministry is underway and producing greater ethnic balance.
- The government and the Constitutional Commission have just produced a draft constitution that the *loya jirga* may approve next month.
- National elections in Afghanistan are scheduled for next year.
- International assistance to Afghanistan is increasing.

- A modern ring road – a boon to commerce, security and national unity – is being built around the country. The Kabul-to-Kandahar portion is to be usable by December of this year.
- And NATO has taken over the UN-mandated ISAF in Kabul, and is expanding its peacekeeping role outside the capital.

Afghanistan's courage and unity will continue to be tested. But it appears that Afghanistan is passing these tests. It's a country on the rise. And it's a country that's no longer affording terrorists the quiet enjoyment of bases of operation.

Iraq

Iraq, too, is a story of difficulties, but also progress and promise. Iraqis, like Afghans, know that they have been liberated from tyranny. They recognize their stake in the Coalition's success, even though a thick residue of fear inhibits many from contributing to that success.

Our strategic goal in Iraq is to give Iraq back to the Iraqi people—well-launched on the road to freedom, security and prosperity. We can't build the new Iraq for them – but we can make sure that, when we leave, they are in a position to build it themselves. Our foremost objective is to improve the security situation to make political and economic development possible. We recognize that security, freedom and prosperity are tightly interrelated. There is no solution to the security problem without progress on the economic and political fronts.

The enemies of our strategic goal are:

1. Former regime loyalists – Saddam's "dead enders;"
2. Foreign fighters – "jihadists;"
3. Terrorist groups—al Qaeda and its allies; and
4. The scores of thousands of criminals that Saddam released from his prisons in the months before the war.

We don't underestimate the task we face – we recognize that the enemy has a number of strengths. For example, the country is awash in munitions, our enemies have access to a lot of money and Saddam remains at large. It doesn't take an enormous effort to attack small numbers of soldiers every week. And the international jihad network has opted to support the fight against the Coalition in Iraq – making Iraq the central battlefield now in the Global War on Terrorism.

But we also know that our enemies have vulnerabilities. For example, the former regime is not popular in the country, and it had and has a very narrow base of public support. Moreover, Iraqis resent the presence of foreign jihadis who have chosen Iraq as the battlefield on which to confront the US. Few Iraqis support the jihadis' ideology.

Another enemy vulnerability is his relatively small geographic base: The vast majority of the attacks against Coalition forces in recent month have occurred in Baghdad and in Saddam's former stronghold north and west of the capital. In large parts of the country in the north and

south the population is well-disposed to the Coalition and those areas are relatively free of such attacks, though there have been horrific bombings in Mosul, Hajaf and, yesterday, in Nasariyah.

We believe the enemy strategy is to:

1. Break Coalition will, through daily attacks on Coalition forces;
2. Target embodiments of success, through attacks on infrastructure and police;
3. Divide and intimidate Iraqis, through assassinations of civilians, including attacks on the Governing Council;
4. Portray the Coalition (especially the US) as imperialist and exploitative;
5. Drive out international organizations and NGOs; and,
6. Slow down progress towards self-rule in the hope that the Coalition will run out of patience and leave.

Coalition forces are taking the initiative to search out the enemy, defeat his efforts and cut off his bases of support. We are doing this through direct action based on specific intelligence, such as the raid conducted against Uday and Qusay and the recent raid by the 82nd Airborne which netted two former Iraqi generals in Fallujah, who are suspected of being key financiers and organizers of anti-coalition activities in the city.

Our forces are innovating at the tactical level. They are using battlefield surveillance radars to locate mortar positions. They're developing and deploying technical means to deal with roadside bombs. And they're continually developing special convoy security measures. Coalition forces have stepped up efforts to guard the borders to prevent the infiltration of foreign fighters and terrorists.

Although the Coalition is doing a lot, the strategic solution to the security problem in Iraq is to enable Iraqis to provide for their own security. And so, the Coalition is organizing and equipping Iraqis and putting them in positions of responsibility for their own security. Having more Iraqis active in their security forces will yield several benefits in helping to reach our strategic objectives. Iraqis have more familiarity with the people and terrain of Iraq. Iraqis can provide better intelligence on the locations of terrorists. A leading role for Iraqi security forces will also show that Iraq is on a rapid course to self-rule and reduce friction between Coalition troops and the population.

More than 100,000 Iraqis are already active in the five security forces: Police; Border Police; Site Protection Service; Civil Defense Corps; and the New Iraqi Army. This number has been growing rapidly – in early September it stood at 62,000. The Iraqi security forces have proven effective in a number of actions. They are taking on an increasing share of the security burden and are suffering casualties.

As I have said, we understand how tightly interrelated the governance, economic and security problems are. Therefore, a key element of our security strategy is improving the lives of the Iraqi people and building Iraqi political institutions. Regarding essential services: Oil production now exceeds 2 million barrels a day and provides revenues for Iraqi salaries and other government expenses. Electricity production has attained pre-war levels. Iraq's educational system has been

reestablished. There are a record 97,000 university-level school applications. Levels of healthcare comparable to the pre-war level have been achieved.

As you know, the Congress has recently appropriated a large sum of money (approximately \$20 billion) for Iraqi reconstruction, including the building up of the security forces. But the US isn't bearing the whole burden: at the recent donors' conference in Madrid, other countries and international institutions pledged about \$13 billion. The major donor countries, aside from the US, were: Japan, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, Kuwait, Spain, Italy, Canada, UAE and South Korea.

As for the building of Iraqi political institutions, the Governing Council has been operating since July and has appointed interim ministers to run Iraqi ministries. The Governing Council has won international recognition in UN Security Council resolution 1511 and from the UN General Assembly and the Arab League. In addition to the national-level council, there are more than 250 councils at the provincial and municipal levels; these represent important steps toward Iraqi self-rule. An Iraqi runs the Central Bank and an Iraqi council of judges has been established to supervise the prosecutorial and judicial systems.

As you are aware from recent press reports, we are continuing our efforts to build up the Iraqis' capability to run their own affairs. And we are working with the Governing Council to help them develop a timeline for drafting a new Constitution and holding elections under it, as called for in UN Security Council resolution 1511. Our guiding principle is that as much authority as possible should be transferred to Iraqi institutions as soon as possible.

We understand how important it is to communicate effectively with the Iraqi people. Our basic message is two-fold: first, we intend to stay the course -- to fulfill our responsibilities and ensure that Iraq is well launched on the path to freedom, security and prosperity. Second, we do not want to rule Iraq, nor will we stay any longer than is necessary. We understand that there is some tension between these two messages -- but we are conveying both of them. Neither is subordinated to the other.

Although the major combat operations that toppled the Saddam regime were over by May 1, the war to determine the future of Iraq continues. The stakes are large: if Iraq can be launched on the path toward freedom, stability and prosperity, the terrorists will have suffered a major defeat and the people of the Middle East will have an alternative model to follow. Our enemies understand this, and we must expect them to throw all their resources into the fight. This struggle will take time -- time to root out enemy fighters and supporters within Iraq, time to gain control of the borders, and, most of all, time to help the Iraqis rebuild their political and security institutions to the point that they will be able to take over the main burden of the fight.

Visitors returning from Iraq commonly comment that what they saw there jibed not at all with the picture of the country that outsiders get from television and newspapers. This is hardly surprising: If all one knew about life in the US was what one saw on local TV news broadcasts, one would imagine that life in America is nothing but murders, power outages, fires and the like. Because we live here, we know that a lot else is going on -- business and industrial work, cultural

and educational life, politics, government and social activities. There's a lot going on in Iraq too that doesn't make the evening news.

Stay the Course

From its inception in the days following 9/11, the President and his team have implemented their strategy for the war on terrorism with steadiness, prudence and good results. The plans for our combat and post-combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq get challenged from time to time, as is inevitable and good in a democracy. Though these plans have, by and large, worked well, we review and revise them continually, as Jerry Bremer's current visit to Washington highlights.

Those plans were and are the product of much cooperation across the US government and with key allies. They helped us avert many ills – for example, Iraq has *not* found itself with masses of internally displaced persons and international refugees, starvation, a collapse of the currency, destruction of the oil fields, the firing of SCUD missiles against Israel or Saudi Arabia or widespread inter-communal violence. There is value in pausing and reflecting on the anticipated catastrophes that we were spared through a combination of foresight, military skill and the kind of luck that tends to favor forces that plan and work hard and wisely.

The United States and its coalition partners are on sound courses in Afghanistan and Iraq, though much remains to be done in both places. As long as we're making progress in rebuilding the infrastructure, in allowing normal life to return and, most importantly, in helping the Afghans and the Iraqis develop political institutions for the future, we are on the path to success – despite the attacks of the terrorists and former regime supporters.

Staying the course won't be easy or cheap. We are reminded of this every time we hear of another attack on US or Coalition forces. The President asked Congress to make available the necessary resources and Congress has done so. To crown our military victories with strategic victories, we'll have to succeed in both the civil and the military aspects of our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In the Global War on Terrorism, we are achieving our goal: We are defeating terrorism as a threat to our way of life. Our coalitions are on the offensive, the terrorists are on the run and the United States has preserved our freedom. The world is safer and better for what we have accomplished. Americans have much to be proud of.

Speech

On the web: <http://www.dod.mil/speeches/2003/sp20031124-0703.html>

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Strategy and the Idea of Freedom

By Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith, for the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., Monday, November 24, 2003.

My association with the Heritage Foundation goes back a ways, twenty-six years, to 1977, when you were still located on Stanton Park at 5th and C, Northeast.

That was a time when we neo-cons, of which I was a junior member, and the folks we called the paleo-cons, made common cause: to support beleaguered democracies, to beleaguer the Soviet empire, and to advocate a US foreign policy of peace through strength.

The Heritage Foundation helped create the alliance of the neo-cons, those of us who started our political lives as Democrats, and the old-fashioned conservatives. It was an alliance of the profoundest type, anchored in philosophical principles. It was not tactical, not a political marriage of convenience.

The realignment of US politics that joined William Buckley with Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz – that bound together supporters of Barry Goldwater with supporters of Scoop Jackson and Hubert Humphrey – has helped change our country and the world. At home, it made the conservative slice of the political spectrum a lively place, intellectually scintillating, creative, ambitious to transform government, attractive to young people, and decidedly non-stodgy.

Abroad, the makers of the Reagan Revolution – with the Heritage Foundation as a key node in the network – elevated the status of ideas as weapons in the arsenal of democracy. The Reaganites understood Realpolitik; they grasped the importance of guns and money and the other "hard" realities of world affairs. But they appreciated also the potency of the human desire for freedom.

They saw the Cold War not as a balance-of-power exercise between two "superpowers" – much less an arms race between "two apes on a treadmill" – but as a noble fight of western liberal democracy against Soviet communist tyranny. They abraded conventional sensibilities by speaking of an "evil empire" and insisting that the truly representative voices in that empire were those of Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel, Andrei Sakharov, Anatoly Sharansky and their fellow dissidents.

This engagement in philosophical warfare, I need hardly remind folks at the Heritage Foundation, created no small controversy in the politics and diplomacy of the western world. President Reagan's talk of democracy and good-versus-evil and his exhortation to tear down the Berlin Wall were widely criticized, even ridiculed, as unsophisticated and de-stabilizing. But it's now widely understood as having contributed importantly to the greatest strategic victory in world history: the collapse of Soviet communism and the liberation of the peoples of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe without war.

As we develop and execute our strategy today in the Global War on Terrorism, there is much to be learned from the Reagan era about the power of ideas. With President George W. Bush having

just returned from Britain, I'd like to recall the remarkable speech that President Reagan gave on June 8, 1982 to the British parliament.

In it, he challenged the pessimism about the future of liberty that was common in the 1970s: "Optimism is in order," he said, "because day by day democracy is proving itself to be a not-at-all fragile flower. ... the regimes planted by totalitarianism have had more than thirty years to establish their legitimacy. But none – not one regime – has yet been able to risk free elections."

President Reagan recognized that democracy is not the preserve of one people or one cultural group. He said that democracy [quote] "already flourishes in countries with very different cultures and historical experiences. It would be cultural condescension, or worse, to say that any people prefer dictatorship to democracy."

Accordingly, President Reagan proposed a program "to foster the infrastructure of democracy, the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities, which allows a people to choose their own way to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means."

That program grew into the National Endowment for Democracy, which recently celebrated its twentieth anniversary. President Bush spoke at the celebration of that anniversary a few weeks ago, recalling Ronald Reagan's words as "courageous and optimistic and entirely correct."

In the last few weeks, in his National Endowment for Democracy speech, and in his speech in London, President Bush carried forward Ronald Reagan's ideas and applied them to the Middle East and the Muslim world generally.

In President Bush's words: "The good and capable people of the Middle East all deserve responsible leadership. For too long, many people in that region have been victims and subjects – they deserve to be active citizens."

As in the case of President Reagan's 1982 speech, George W. Bush's advocacy of democracy serves a number of purposes: The "advance of freedom" is, President Bush said, not only the "calling of our time, ... it is the calling of our country."

But there's more at work here than just idealism. All free peoples have a practical stake in the spread of democratic institutions and the rule of law. Promoting freedom is fundamental to this Administration's policy in the Middle East, and in the Muslim world in general, and in the war on terrorism.

The Bush Administration's strategy in the war on terrorism has three parts:

- First, disrupting and destroying terrorist networks and infrastructure.
- Second, the protection of our homeland.
- And third is the intellectual component of creating a global anti-terrorist environment. We call this third part the "Battle of ideas."

Our aim in that battle is to de-legitimize terrorism as an instrument of politics. This means working to change the way people think, making toleration of terrorism – let alone support for it – unacceptable to anyone who wishes to be regarded as respectable. As President Bush's National Security Strategy says: People everywhere should put terrorism in the same despised category as slave-trading, piracy and genocide.

President Bush alluded to this point in London last week when he noted that American "zeal" has been inspired by English examples and he cited "the firm determination of the Royal Navy over the decades [of the early nineteenth century] to find and end the trade in slaves."

If the United States and its Coalition partners are to succeed in changing the way the world thinks about terrorism, we'll have to ensure that terrorism is punished rather than rewarded and that state sponsors of terrorism pay a price for their activities. (The Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes have paid an especially large price.)

But our efforts also have to target the recruitment and indoctrination of terrorists. No matter how successful we are at killing and capturing terrorists, or intercepting their weapons and funds, we can't win the war on terrorism unless we can reduce the supply of new terrorists. **So, what are the circumstances that create fertile ground for the recruitment of terrorists?**

I see many of the usual answers as off the mark.

Consider, for example, the phenomenon of suicide bombers -- terrorists who perform attacks that they know they cannot survive. **Many commentators have asserted that such terrorists don't calculate the benefits and costs of their actions. Westerners commonly assume that only a person ensnared in deep despair could do such a thing.**

This diagnosis implies its own solution -- that the world should address what are called the "root causes of terrorism," the poverty and political hopelessness that many people imagine are the traits and motives of the suicide bombers. This diagnosis, however, doesn't correspond to our actual experience. And it blinds us to opportunities we have to confront terrorism strategically.

When we look at the records of the suicide bombers, we see that many aren't drawn from the poor. Mohammed Atta, for instance -- a key figure in executing the September 11 attack -- was a middle-class Egyptian whose parents were able to send him to study abroad. And his education meant that he could look forward to a relatively privileged life in Egypt -- hardly grounds for extreme despair.

Rather, what characterizes terrorists seems to be a strange mixture of perverse hopes:

First of all, some bombers cherish a perverse form of religious hope. The promise of eternity in paradise is a tenet of many faiths, a noble incentive and consolation to millions of people. It's as cynical as it is sinister that leaders of al Qaida, Ansar al-Islam, Hezbollah, Hamas and other groups convince young people that eternity in paradise is available as a reward for murder.

Second, there is the bomber's hope of earthly glory and reward -- praise as a hero from political leaders and honor for one's parents.

Third, there is the bomber's political hope. Suicide bombing is what defense analysts categorize as a form of asymmetric warfare, a means for the weak to fight the strong. Some terrorists are motivated by their hope that it is a winning strategy.

This suggests a strategic course for us: attack the sources of these malignant hopes.

Regarding the religious hope: Many Muslim religious leaders disapprove of suicide bombing -- but many have been silenced or intimidated to voice support for the terrorists. The civilized world can do more to support moderate clerics, defend them and provide them with platforms on which to protect their religion from extremists who want to distort and hijack it.

The civilized world should also deal with political leaders who heap honor (and money) on the suicide bombers and their families. President Bush, speaking of suicide bombers, said: "They are not martyrs. They are murderers." Other world leaders have the responsibility to reinforce this message.

Finally, as to the suicide bombers' political hopes, it is important that terrorism be seen as a losing strategy. It is of strategic importance that neither in Iraq nor Afghanistan nor elsewhere will the terrorists achieve success.

In addition to batting down these perverted hopes, our mission is to create the conditions in which the people of the Middle East and elsewhere in the Islamic world can cherish the humane aspirations of free people everywhere for liberty and an opportunity to use their talents to win a measure of prosperity for themselves and their families.

As President Bush noted: **"Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe -- because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export."**

We're now engaged in creating the conditions for freedom in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Although there is much to be said about Afghanistan -- in my remaining time, I'll confine myself to a brief review of the situation in Iraq.

Our work in that country is guided by President Bush's idea that a successful, new Iraq could serve as a model to the Arab and Muslim worlds of modernization, moderation, democracy and economic well-being. A free and prosperous Iraq could provide tens of millions of people with an alternative way to think about the future: Life doesn't have to be dominated by fanaticism and tyranny.

We want to give the Iraq people the opportunity to create a new and thriving Iraq – but we can't create it for them. The problems are many and large. We should not play Polyanna. But substantial progress has been achieved.

Iraq's national Governing Council is the most representative government Iraq has ever had – and it's gaining acceptance at home and abroad. It's appointed interim ministers, who run the ministries, setting budgets and making policy. Local councils and officials are beginning to exercise power – countering Iraq's history of extreme centralization.

Last week, the Governing Council, working with Ambassador Jerry Bremer, announced a process and timetable for creating a transitional government, electing the members of a Constitutional Convention, drafting and ratifying a new constitution and holding elections under it to elect a permanent government for Iraq.

In addition to the national Governing Council, there are over 250 governing councils functioning at the municipal and provincial levels throughout Iraq. This is a development of high significance, though generally under-reported.

The problem that dominates the news reports from Iraq is, of course, security. It's a problem that's interwoven with political and economic developments in Iraq, but I'll offer a few comments specifically about the military dimension, which is under the responsibility of General John Abizaid, the Commander of US Central Command.

General Abizaid is an intelligent and tough-minded commander who knows the region, has analyzed the various elements that compose the enemy forces and has devised an aggressive strategy to defeat them. The strategy includes offensive pressure, precise and relentless, to capture or kill enemy leaders and fighters, to disrupt and defeat their operations, to cut off their sources of supply and support and to extract and exploit intelligence. We are applying technology to counter the enemy's improvised bombs, mortars and other weapons. Our forces are adapting continually to counter enemy tactics.

Our enemies in Iraq are not numerous and not popular. Only a small portion of the Iraqi population has any desire to see the return of Baathist tyranny or the establishment of a government of extremist jihadists. But our enemies are well-financed, well-armed and motivated by the recognition that the success of Iraqi democratic political reconstruction will end or severely damage their several causes. No one should underestimate the difficulty of our mission. But no one should doubt that the US-led Coalition will succeed.

Our strategy aims to put the Iraqis in a position to run their own lives, manage their own government and provide for their own security – and to leave as soon as we have done so.

Thus, we have a dual message to convey to the Iraqi people:

- First, that we in the Coalition will stay the course and see the job through until Iraq is well-launched on the path to freedom and prosperity.

- But second, that we have no ambition to rule the Iraqis and intend to hand their country back to them as soon as we can.

Fundamental to our strategy is getting more Iraqis trained and equipped to provide security for their own country. We are creating a new force, the Civil Defense Corps, which will perform combined operations with US and Coalition forces. We are also rebuilding the Iraqi police force, which disintegrated with the old regime's collapse. Re-training will also be necessary – the old Iraqi police force was not a capable institution: the real work of "law enforcement" (if one can call it that) under the old regime was done by the now-disbanded internal security services, using means that can have no place in a free Iraq.

Even as the new Iraqi security forces are being trained, they can take over some tasks, such as fixed-site security. Highly-skilled U.S. troops are not needed for such missions. US troops can more efficiently be kept in reserve to provide a quick reaction force that can deal with situations that go beyond the Iraqi forces' abilities.

As more Iraqis function in the various security forces, they will improve the Coalition's intelligence, which is the key to dealing with former regime loyalists and with terrorists. Knowledge of the terrain, of the society and of the language are all advantages that an indigenous force will have over any outside force, no matter how well-trained or technologically advanced.

Although we are on the right tracks in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is no doubt that we still face difficulties in both countries. But it bears recalling that, in 1982, when President Reagan gave the London speech from which I quoted earlier, we also faced difficult, even frightening, national security problems, and bitter controversy over the prudence of our policies and their chances for success.

Now, when we look back twenty years, the Cold War's successful conclusion appears not just brilliant but inevitable. **Indeed, many Americans across the political spectrum now recall the Cold War with a sort of nostalgia as a time when the nature of the enemy was clear and our key foreign policy choices were obvious. But, as this audience knows, it was nothing of the sort – there were intense debates and doubts about the course President Reagan took in those years, especially what was criticized as his moralistic approach to confronting the Soviet empire.**

I believe that, twenty years from now, President's Bush strategy – the actions in the war on terrorism that I have been discussing and other initiatives that I haven't mentioned, such as the transformation of our alliance structures and the transformation of our military forces – will also appear excellent, inevitable and perhaps even obvious. We'll look back at them with pride and satisfaction, knowing that the United States rose to the challenge of the defense of our freedom with skill, moral clarity, determination – and success.

Speech

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Transforming the U.S. Global Defense Posture

By Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith, to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, December 3, 2003.

I am pleased to be back here under the sponsorship of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I thank your President, John Hamre, for the Center's hospitality and for his personal continuing contributions to U.S. national security policy.

The Policy organization at the Pentagon does two main kinds of work. There are the day-to-day tasks – drafting instructions for negotiators, for example, or working a coalition issue in the war on terrorism, conducting defense talks with other countries or responding to a civil war in Liberia. This topical work tends to attract the most attention from the Congress, the press and the public.

But some of the most important work we do grabs few headlines. This is the longer-term thinking about U.S. defense strategy, which is the Policy organization's second major line of effort.

From the moment President Bush came into office, he has asked the Defense Department how best to position the United States in the world for the decades ahead. He and Secretary Rumsfeld have demanding appetites for strategic thought – that is, large ideas, broad in scope, that set courses that can run many years into the future.

The name given to this effort is "transformation," because the President is determined that the Defense Department think boldly and remake itself thoroughly, changing the way we:

- Train and equip our forces,
- Use them, for combat, stability operations and otherwise,
- Position those forces around the world ,
- Work with allies and partners, and
- Conduct procurement and other business activities.

Some people think of "transformation" narrowly as a matter of using new technologies to produce better weapons. But the concept is more comprehensive.

A key facet of transformation is realigning our global defense posture – that is, updating the types, locations, numbers, and capabilities of our military forces, and the nature of our alliances. That's the aspect of transformation I want to talk with you about today.

Even before 9/11, President Bush said that the security threats of the future would differ from those of the Cold War era – that they required a different way of thinking and of organizing our

defenses. He campaigned on a platform of transformation. Since the Soviet empire collapsed, he observed, the world changed far more radically than our own defense doctrines, institutions, equipment and alliances had changed.

I can report that the United States has made progress toward transformation during the Bush Administration.

First, we've transformed our relationship with Russia. We've recognized that the hostility that characterized US-Soviet relations during the Cold War has ended, hostility that was enshrined in the doctrine of "mutual assured destruction" and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Accordingly, along with the hostility, we've set aside that morally dubious doctrine and that out-dated treaty. We're cooperating with Russia in many fields. And Presidents Bush and Putin agreed formally to make unprecedented cuts in their nuclear arsenals. At the beginning of this Administration many commentators voiced anxiety about the risks of US-Russian tensions over arms control, NATO expansion and other issues. This is now a non-issue.

Second, we are transforming our Alliances. Today, we have an enlarged NATO with increasing (though still far from adequate) capabilities, a good plan for streamlining NATO's command structure, a new NATO Four-Star Command focused specifically on military transformation and an affirmative answer once and for all to that old chestnut – can NATO take on a mission "out of area." NATO has taken on command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and NATO assisted Poland in assuming command of a multinational division responsible for stabilizing a portion of southern Iraq.

Likewise, we are developing a more robust US-Japanese alliance, an up-to-date US-South Korean alliance, and a strengthened U.S.-Australian alliance. Our key Asian and Pacific allies are investing in new technologies, playing roles in Afghanistan and Iraq, coordinating with us regarding global and regional threats, such as the North Korean nuclear program, and working with us to rationalize the US troop "footprint" in their countries to keep the alliances sustainable and capable well into the 21st Century.

And, of course, we are transforming US military capabilities – strategies, technology and organization, as well as hardware.

As we have transformed deterrence and our alliances, we want to transform our global posture. Our current posture as John Hamre mentioned, still reflects in many ways the mentality and reality of the Cold War era, during which US forces deployed forward were defensive, tripwire units that were expected to fight near where they were based. The kind of forces used for that mission are not the agile, fast, lean forces we need for the future.

Our forces overseas should not remain positioned to fight the Cold War. In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's demise, we reduced the numbers of US troops deployed forward. But they remained concentrated in their Cold War locations, from which they have had to be deployed to deal with crises elsewhere – in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and other locations. Key premises underlying our forward posture have changed fundamentally: We no

longer expect our forces to fight in place; rather, their purpose is to project power into theaters that may be distant from where they are based.

We are revising our thinking about forward deployed forces in light of our new strategic circumstances. The 9/11 terrorist attack literally brought home to us how dangerous those circumstances can be:

Terrorists as well as rogue states can command formidable destructive power, including through access to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, but also by targeting the critical infrastructure on which advanced industrial societies rely:

- U.S. and friendly territories are vulnerable.
- The proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and missiles continues.
- Ungoverned areas serve as breeding grounds for global terrorism.
- Threats from these sources may require immediate military responses.

President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld directed a reexamination of US forward deployments that is free of old orthodoxies and takes the long view. We are aiming to achieve the most basic and comprehensive review of the nation's global defense posture since the United States became a world power.

In the immediate post-World-War-II period, Dean Acheson had a sense that his work was creating institutions that would last a long time; he made that point by entitling his memoirs Present at the Creation. President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld likewise are thinking about the relatively distant future. In developing plans to realign our forces abroad, they are not focused on the diplomatic issues of the moment, but on the strategic requirements and opportunities of the coming decades.

Let's be clear about what we are and what we are not aiming to achieve through transforming our global defense posture:

We are not aiming at retrenchment, curtailing U.S. commitments, isolationism or unilateralism. On the contrary, our realignment plans are motivated by appreciation of the strategic value of our defense alliances and partnerships with other states.

We are aiming to increase our ability to fulfill our international commitments more effectively.

We are aiming to ensure that our alliances are capable, affordable, sustainable and relevant in the future.

We are not focused narrowly on force levels, but are addressing force capabilities.

We are not talking about fighting in place, but moving to the fight.

We are not talking only about basing, we are talking about the ability to move forces when and where needed.

In transforming the US global defense posture:

We want to make our forces more responsive given the world's many strategic uncertainties.

We want to make our military presence increasingly rotational with the emphasis, as I've noted, on the capabilities of forces rather than their numbers.

We want to benefit as much as possible from the strategic prepositioning of equipment and support.

We want to make better use of our capabilities by thinking of our forces globally, rather than as simply regional assets.

We want to be able to bring more combat capabilities to bear in less time, that is, we want to have the ability to surge our forces to crisis spots from wherever our forces might be.

Strengthen Allied Roles

It bears reemphasizing: Our military forces, both forward deployed and based at home, are only part of our military capability. Another part is rooted in the network of alliances and security relationships we have created with other nations. When the United States acts in the world, we don't act by ourselves, but as a part of a community of states. That network of friendships and alliances is a valuable element of this community. The network's composition and nature have changed over the years as strategic circumstances in the world have changed. To surmount such problems as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failed states, we need to organize differently and increase our capabilities. Realigning the US global defense posture is an essential part of what we need to do.

Understanding of our realignment plans should help lay to rest the accusations that the US favors "unilateralism" in national security affairs. Our plans will help ensure that the US has the defense resources and relationships in place to allow us to work with allies and friends in the future. It will make those relationships affordable and usable, that is to say, relevant.

Our intent is to expand existing security relationships, and develop new ones. We want to build partnerships that manage concerns, ensure compatibility among forces, and facilitate intelligence sharing. In some cases US forces will be in a supporting role, in other cases, US forces will be supported. For example, we were in a supporting role when West African ECOWAS forces intervened recently in Liberia and when Australian forces did their peace operations in East Timor. Examples of support for U.S. forces include NATO ISAF forces in Afghanistan, and the role British and Polish forces have taken in commanding multinational divisions in Iraq.

Changes in the U.S. global posture also aim to help our allies and friends modernize their own forces, strategies and doctrines. As we discuss the US realignment with them, we are discussing cooperative transformation efforts. The new NATO Response Force and Allied Command – Transformation in Norfolk are examples of combined allied transformation efforts.

Realigning the U.S. posture will also help strengthen our alliances by tailoring the physical US "footprint" to suit local conditions. The goal is to reduce friction with host nations, the kind that results from accidents and other problems relating to local sensitivities. Removal of the U.S. Air Expeditionary Wing from Prince Sultan Air Base, for example, should help improve our relations with the Saudis, and relocating U.S. forces south and out of the densely-populated Seoul area in Korea will help remedy various problems with the Korean public while serving other important military purposes as well.

Contend with Uncertainty

Our new posture emphasizes agility to respond to changing circumstances. Intelligence is never perfect, so we need to be able to hedge against errors regarding emerging threats. We need to plan, but we must plan to be surprised. Our forces will be deployed forward in regions selected to enable them to reach potential crisis spots quickly. We also want to maintain familiarity with various parts of the globe.

Focus Across Regions as well as within them

In the Cold War, we focused on threats to specific regions. Now we are dealing with threats that are global in nature. So global strategies and actions are required. President Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative is an example of a global strategy for dealing with the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and missile-related materiel and technology. We need to be positioned properly – with the right forces, the right relationships and the right authority – to execute that strategy. In addition, we want to develop our capacity to project power from one region to another – threats don't respect the administrative boundaries of the Defense Department's Unified Command Plan.

There is value in developing support capabilities away from front lines – relying on so-called "reachback" technology. For example, intelligence support, including battle damage assessment, can be provided from outside the theater of operations. We also may be able to increase our use of "reachback" capabilities of our allies and friends.

Develop Rapidly Deployable Capabilities

Because our forward-deployed forces are unlikely to fight where they are based, our key goal must be to make those forces rapidly deployable to the relevant areas as events require.

We can project power in a rapid manner, whether from bases in the US or overseas, but it is helpful to have support infrastructure overseas. Examples of an expeditionary approach to warfighting that drew upon such infrastructure include Kosovo, a case of power projection within a region, in pursuit of regional stability and in concert with regional allies, and

Afghanistan, a case of global power projection, in which forces flowed into Central Asia from US, European, and Asian theaters. We are encouraging allies to establish deployable – truly usable – headquarters and forces. We intend to increase combined training for expeditionary operations, for example, to encourage Allied participation in so-called "high-end" U.S. exercises

For this deployability concept to work, US forces must be able to move smoothly into, through, and out of host nations, which puts a premium on establishing legal and support arrangements with many friendly countries. We are negotiating or planning to negotiate with many countries legal protections for US personnel, through Status of Forces Agreements and agreements (known as Article 98 agreements) limiting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court with respect to our forces' activities. And we are putting in place so-called cross-servicing agreements so that we can rapidly reimburse countries for support they provide to our military operations.

Focus on Capabilities, Not Numbers

Military capabilities have increased stunningly over the past decade as a result of technology and innovations in tactics. Our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown the world how relatively small forces can have large, strategic effects. A single fighter/bomber sortie now hits multiple targets, whereas in the past, multiple sorties were required to hit a single target. Small teams of Special Forces and Marines, supported by flexible close air support and often operating together with indigenous forces, were able to accomplish missions in Afghanistan and Iraq that in the past would have required brigades or divisions. Old military thinking about numbers has been overtaken thoroughly by events. Longstanding notions about ratios of offensive versus defensive forces and about how much can be accomplished by a certain number of troops or platforms have had to be revised wholesale.

Military and political leaders around the world are just beginning to absorb the lessons of the recent fighting and to appreciate why US officials emphasize military capabilities as opposed to numbers of forces. These lessons have an important bearing on our global posture realignment. Our key purpose, as I've noted, is to push increased capabilities forward, which is crucial to the security of the United States and our allies and friends. That purpose does not require that we push additional forces forward. In fact, we can now have far greater capabilities forward than in the past with smaller numbers of forces. We want to ensure that our allies and friends recognize that, in transforming our posture, we are strengthening our commitment to secure our common interests, even in those places where we may be reducing forces levels.

Conclusion

Last week, President Bush announced that we would "realign the global posture of our forces to better address" the new challenges we face and would be consulting around the world on this matter. I have discussed the principles and purposes of our realignment work. But I want to stress that no final decisions have been made.

So the consultations that the President announced last week will be real consultations – all the decisions the President will eventually make will depend on the inputs we receive in the course of these consultations. How our partners react to our ideas is important to us, as are the steps they

are willing to take to advance our common security interests through host-nation support and other means.

Indeed, the consultations in and of themselves are an element of our global posture. They help strengthen our relationships by harmonizing our thinking and our assessment of threats and military requirements. They give us an opportunity to explain the rationale of our global realignment – such as our focus on capabilities rather than numbers.

In their recent trips to Asia and Europe, Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell began to describe our efforts. Next week, my colleague Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman and I will carry forward the consultations, which will over time include US allies and partners in every region of the world. This is a global initiative, and our consultations will be global.

Our friends and allies are sensitive to changes in the US overseas posture. That is why we are consulting with them before the President or Secretary Rumsfeld makes any decisions on changes. Whatever improvements in military effectiveness the actual posture decisions produce, they will serve our interests fully only if they also help sustain and strengthen our ties with our friends, allies and partners around the world. We are confident that they will.